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EFFECT OF DEATH ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: STATUTES DEALING WITH DEATH OF
A PERSON LIABLE TO AN ACTION

Where the statute of limitations has commenced running prior
to the death of the person and prior to his death no action was
commenced, m the absence of some other statute, his death will
not toll or suspend the regular statute of limitations.' Where the
cause of action accrues subsequent to the death of the person,
however, the statute will not commence running until such time
as an administrator of his estate is appointed. 2 The reason for
this latter result is that, until such time, there is no one amenable
to suit for the cause of action then existing.3 It shall be the primary
purpose of this note to explore the various state statutes enacted
to attempt mitigation of this otherwise harsh rule of no-suspension
upon death where the statute has commenced running. The principal
consideration will be those statutes, similarly phrased, and perhaps
4
derived from the same source as the North Dakota provision.
This note shall also concern itself with the situation resulting upon
the death of the person against whom a cause of action has accrued,
rather than the situation resulting upon the death of a person
entitled to bring an action. Throughout the note, there will be some
general reference to probate procedure and statutes of the various
jurisdictions involved to the extent that they affect the problem
under consideration.
Beyond the scope of this note will be any discussion of the
rules regarding substitution of parties after an action has commenced as affecting the running of the statute of limitations. 5 Also
1. E.g., Rossner v. Jeffrey, 234 Ark. 723, 354 S.W.2d 705 (1962), Berger v. O'Hearn,
41 Cal.2d 729, 264 P.2d 10 (1953),
Glenn V McDavid, 316 Ill.App. 130, 44 N.E.2d 84
(Ct.App. 1942), In re Hoeig's Estate, 230 Iowa 718, 298 N.W 887 (1941), Parrish v.
McKee, 59 Ohio Op. 316, 135 N.E.2d 486 (CtC.P. 1956).
2. See e.g., Matthews v. Matthews, 177 So.2d 497 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1965) , Hewitt v.
Biege, 183 Kan. 352, 327 P.2d 872 (1958).
3. See Berger v. Jackson, 156 Fla. 251, 23 So.2d 265 (1945). But see Wrinkle v. Trabert, 174 Ohio St. 233, 188 N.E.2d 587 (1963)
(plaintiff had the power to have an administrator appointed but failed to do so, thus causing the loss of his cause of action).
4. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-26 (1960).
5. See Fed. R. Civ. P 25 (a)
Annot. 67 A.L.R.2d 497 (1959) (continuance of civil
case because of illness or death of counsel).
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beyond the inquiry here will be any discussion of the various nonclaim statutes, except as they affect the particular problem here
involved. 6 Further, there will be no discussion of statutes for
wrongful death in view of the fact that these often provide limitation
periods separate and apart from those prescribed in general limitation statutes.t
SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

The potential harshness of a rule whereby the applicable
statute of limitation is not suspended following the death of a person
liable to suit is readily apparent. The problem might best be illustrated by a hypothetical case. Assume that A is injured by the
negligence of B on January 1, 1960. The applicable statute of limitation provides for a two year period in which suit must be brought.
B dies in June, 1961, when there are six months of the statute
left to run. In this situation, the plaintiff's claim could be lost if
he had no knowledge of the defendant's demise, or was unable to
secure the appointment of a representative before the expiration
of the statutory 8 This would be especially true in a jurisdiction
having a statute allowing the personal representative or administrator a period of immunity from suit after appointment.9 In such
a case, the period of immunity might well cause the loss of the
plaintiff's claim in spite of his efforts to bring the action. 10 Further,
it is felt that where the person liable dies, a period of tine should
be afforded the personal representative in which to acquaint himself
with all the claims against the estate before he is required to
defend an action. 1
As a result of these considerations, many states have enacted
statutes suspending the running of limitations from the time of the
person's death until the appointment of a representative or administrator of his estate."2 A similar result is reached by suspending
6. See Annot. A.L.R. 289 (1938).
7.
See e.g., Wilson v. Tromly, 403 Ill. 307, 89 N.E.2d 22 (1949), Annot. 174 A.L.R.
815 (1948) (time from which statute of limitations begins to run against action for wrongful death) , Annot. 67 A.L.R. 1070 (1930) (Provision of death statute as to time of bringing action as a condition of the right of action or as a mere statute of limitations).
8. See Berger v. O'Hearn, supra note 1, at 12, Blaskower v. Steel, 23 Ore. 106, 31
P 258 (1892).
9. E.g., AL. CODE tit. 7, § 29 (1960) (exempt from suit for 6 months) KY. REv. STAT.
§ 395.270 (1962) (providing for 5 months after date of qualification of 1st personal representative of a decedents estate before an action shall be commenced against an executor
or administrator thereof) , S.C. CODE § 19-554 (1962) (providing for 6 months period after
death of decedent).
10. See Blaskower v. Steel, supra note 8, at 254.
Great
11. See Jones v. Womack, 53 Ga.App. 741, 187 S.E. 285 (Ga.Ct.App. 1936)
Southern Box Co. v. Barrett, 231 Miss. 101, 94 So.2d 912 (1957).
12. E.g., ALL. CODE tit. 7, § 53 (1958) (statute is suspended for a period not exceeding
six months) , MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.16 (1947) (statute is suspended for a period not
exceeding six months before granting of letters and a further period of six months after
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the statute of limitations for a reasonable time only, or for such
time as is necessary to secure the appointment of an administrator
for the estate. 13 Where such relief from the rule of no-suspension

is provided, it might still be necessary to ascertain whether the
claim must be presented to the estate for payment before any
action is commenced. If the claim is one appropriate for presentation
as a claim against the estate, it could be lost by the failure to
present it to the estate within the time prescribed by statute. 14 This
same consideration prevails in all aspects of this discussion and
no specific reference will be made to it hereafter.
EXTENSION

STATUTES

Most of the states have enacted statutes purporting to alter
the time in which an action may be brought against the estate
of the person liable. 15 Many of the statutes 16 contain some variation
of the following language as respects actions against the representatives of the person liable:
If a person against whom an action may be brought die
before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement thereof, and the cause of action survive, an action may
be commenced against his representatives, after the expiration of that time, and within one year after the isstung of
letters testamentary or of administration.1?
It will be seen that this provision standing alone, is subject
to different interpretations. Arguably, the last portion of the section
should govern thus giving the statute the effect of a limitation
statute. Considering the statute in its entirety, however, results in
the equally valid conclusion that it is an extension of the regular
statute of limitations. At any rate, this particular type of statute
has caused some confusion as to just what is intended.' 8 This has
been especially true where a particular court seeks to reconcile
granting of letters) , N.D.

CENT. CODE § 30-18-09

(1960 )

(The

running of the statute is

suspended following death until such time as a creditor is authorized to apply for letters of administration).
13. E.g., Gentry v. Mitchell, 207 Okla. 488, 250 P.2d 856 (1952) (claim held barred),
Robitaille v. Mumaugh, 167 Okla. 337, 29 P.2d 602 (1934) (claim not barred).
14. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-18-04 (1960).
15.
E.g., IND. ANN. STAT.
COMP. LAws § 609.18 (1948).

16.

§

2-607

ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.150 (1962)

(1946),

IOWA CODE ANN.

§

614.2

(1950),

MICH.

(6 months after issuing of letters testamentary)

ILL. REV. STAT. ch 83 § 20. (Smith-Hurd 1966) (9
CAL. CODE Cr. Psoc. § 353 (1954)
(1962),
KY. REV. STAT. § 413.180 (3)
months after issuing of letters testamentary)
N.C. GEN.
NEv. REV. STAT. § 11.310 (2) (1963)
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-2704 (1947)

ORE. RXv. STAT. § 12.190, (1965)
STAT. § 1-22 (1953) N.D.CENT. CODE § 28-01-26 (1960)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-37
S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-107 (1962), S.D. CODE § 33.0205 (1939)
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.34 (1966).
(1953), WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.200 (1962)
17. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-231 (1948).
Strain v. Babb,
18. See e.g., Genslinger v. New Ill. Ath. Club, 229 Ill.App. 428 (1923)
Curran v. Witter, 68 Wis. 16, 31 N.W. 705 (1887).
30 S.C. 342, 9 S.E. 271 (1889)
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this type of provision with the non-claim statutes dealing with the
presentation of claims to the administrator 19
Generally, this type of provision is found in a section of the
state statutes dealing with the various periods of limitation and
with tolling or suspension provisions. 20 For the most part, the
construction placed on them has been that they allow the plaintiff
21

additional time in which to bring the action, if such time is needed.

That is, under the above quoted statute, if the death of the defendant

occurred within the last year of the period allowed by the general
statue of limitations, this special statute would apply, thus giving
the plaintiff at least one year from the granting of letters in which
to bring the action. If, however, the general statute was greater
in length than the one year period, the general statute would apply 22
It will be seen, then, that the statute here involved might serve to
extend the running of the limitation period, but would not operate
2
to limit the period otherwise applicable. 8

In a few instances, however, there has been confusion caused
by the existence of this particular statute. 24 This is perhaps a byproduct of the notion that there should be some point of finality in

the settling of a decedent's estate. Under a statute such as here
involved, it is conceivable that a tort claim may not be barred
for some years after the death of the person liable thus hampering
any final settlement and distribution of the estate. This is unlike
the situation with respect to contract claims where a non-claim

statute may prescribe a definite time in which claims are to be
presented, after which time they will be barred. 25 Florida provides
an excellent study of the resolution of this dichotomy In that state

prior to 1892, the statute was phrased as follows:
If a person against whom an action may be brought die before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement
thereof, and the cause of action survives, an action may be

commenced against his executors or administrators after the
19. See e.g., White v. Coleman, 146 Wash. 148, 262 P 232 (1927).
20. E.g., NEV. REv. ST4T. § 11.310 (196S) , S.D. CODE § 3S.0205 (1939), Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 893.34 (1966).
21. E.g., Sammis v. Wightman, 31 Fla. 10, 12 So. 526 (1893), Miller v. Lewiston Nat.
Bank, 18 Idaho 124, 108 P. 901 (1910), Hodge v. Perry, 255 N.C. 695, 122 S.E.2d 677
Bank of Montreal V. Bu(1961)
Benson v. Bennett, 112 N.C. 505, 17 S.E. 432 (1893)
chanan, 32 Wash. 480, 73 P 482) (1903) , Curran v. Witter, supra note 18.
22. E.g., Miller v. Lewiston Nat. Bank, supra note 21 Blaskower v. Steel, 23 Ore. 106,
31 P 253 (1892) , Gray Realty Co. v. Robinson, 111 Utah 521, 184 P.2d 237 (1947).
23. E.g., Harris v. Mt. Washington Co., 55 CaI.App. 144, 202 P 903 (Dist.Ct.App.
1921)
Bank of Montreal v. Buchanan, supra note 21, at 484, Palmer v. O'Rourke, 130
Wis. 507, 110 N.W 389 (1907).
24. E.g., Langroise v. Cummings, 123 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1941) (construing the Idaho
provision as applicable only to those circumstances where the claim was not a claim appropriate for filing with the personal representative) , Irvin v. Harris, 182 N.C. 656, 109
S.E. 871 (1921)
Gray Realty Co. v. Robinson, supra note 22.
25. E.g., N.D. CENT. COD § 30-18-04 (1960).
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expiration of that time, and within one year after
the issu26
ing of letters testamentary or of administration.
This statute was found in the section dealing with tolling of the
general statute of limitations applicable and, as construed, operated
to give the person one year from the time of issuance of letters
in which to bring the action unless the general statute of limitations
still had a greater period than one year to run. 27 The court in
construing this section in this manner, noted the possibility of conflicting interpretations. In this regard, an earlier case,2 8 which
had indicated that the section should be construed as an independent
or distinct limitation upon the right to bring suit, was discussed.
The court reasoned, however, that the avowed purpose of the statute
was to prolong, and not to curtail the time in which an action
could be brought.2 9 As a part of a general revision of the Florida
statutes, and perhaps as a result of this conflict, this section was
later modified to read as follows:
If a person against whom a suit may be brought die, such
suit shall not be brought against his executor or administrator after two years from the issuance of letters testamentary
or of administrator 30
In construing this statute, the court in Inman v Davis 1 held, that
it should be given the effect of a non-claim statute and hence
the period prescribed therein was, in itself, a limitation period.
The belief of the court seemed to be that the change in phraseology
clearly pointed to the revisor's intention that the section operate
as a non-claim provision thus securing similar treatment as to all
claims against the estate.3 2 The conclusion of this court seemed
to be that the estate should be settled as expeditiously as possible,
and that the statute was changed to aid in achieving this end. 88
Today, the provision appears in the Florida probate law and
reads as follows:
If a person against whom a cause of action exists dies before the expiration of the time limited for commencement
thereof and the cause of action survives, claim shall be
26.
27.
28.
29.
same
Smith
30.
31.
32.
33.

Sammis V. Wightnan, 31 Fla. 10, 12 So. 526 (1893).
Id. at 633.
Sanderson's Administrators v. Sanderson, 17 Fa. 820, 850 (1880).
Sammis V. Wightman, supra note 26 at 534, the court here also notes that the
construction had been placed on a similar statute by the California court, citing
V. Hall, 19 Cal. 85 (1861).
See Inman v. Davis, 125 Fla. 298, 169 So. 741 (1936).
Id. at 743.
Id. at 742.
Id. at 743.

NOTES
filed thereon and like proceedings had as in the case of
other claims against the estate. 84
As the statute now stands, there can be little doubt as to the
intention of the legislature. The Florida position as to settlement
of estates and construction of their probate law is stated in
Bedenbaugh v Lawrence"5 as follows:
[I]t is apparent that it is a matter of public policy m this
State that estates of decedents shall be speedily and finally
determined. To effect this policy, statutes of non-claim and
of limitations have been set up. When these limitations have
expired, any and all claims of whatsoever nature are barred
forever The limitations operate against contingent as well
as other claims or demands. The period of limitations is
an effective both in law and equity (Emphasis by the court)
The instruction provided by the Florida experience might be of
interest to those states now having a statute in the same or similar
terms as the early Florida statute. If the desired end is finality of
administration of the estate, the enactment of a statute such as
Florida now has, would serve this end quite well. On the other
hand, if the end to be gained is the allowance of additional time
to the injured party, where, but for such time, the general statute
would run, the present statute could be construed or perhaps clarified
to attain this goal.
It should be noted that other jurisdictions, originally having
a statute in the same terms as the early Florida provision, have
altered or at least modified their statutes, perhaps in response to
factors such as were present under the Florida experience."6 As
an example, New York now has a statute providing:
The period of 18 months after the death, within or without
the state, of a person against whom a cause of action exists
is not a part of the time within which the action must be
commenced against his executor or administrator 87
This section as earlier construed,38 was enacted to alleviate some
of the hardships inherent in a no-suspension rule, especially where
there might be difficulty in getting an administrator appointed. 9
34. rLA. STAT. ANN. 1 784.28 (1964).
35. 141 Fla. 341, 193 So. 74 (1940).
36. See e.g., MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 541.16 (1947)
NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.310 (2b) (1963)
(Nevada adds a proviso dealing with claims presented to the estate as required by law
and with real estate of the decedent not being liable for debts unless letters are granted
within 3 years of the death).
37. N.Y. Cirv. Paoc. § 210 (b) (1963).
38. Butler v. Price, 271 App.Div. 259, 65 N.Y.S.2d 688 (1946).
39. Id. at 690.
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A lower court in New York has held, however, that the section
should not operate as an extension of the general statute of limitations, but instead, should be construed as establishing an alternative period as do non-claim statutes.4 0 It might be pointed out
that the construction thus placed on this section is in opposition
to the legislative intent and obvious purpose of the statute.4'1 Nevertheless, the case does evidence the concern expressed as well by
some other courts over the differing limitation periods depending
upon whether or not the claim is one appropriate for presentation
42
as a claim against the estate.
NORTH DAKOTA STATUTE

The statute in North Dakota dealing with this problem provides
as follows:
If a person against whom an action may be brought dies
before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement thereof and the cause of action survives and is not one
based upon a claim which may be filed in a probate proceeding, an action may be commenced against his executors
or administrators after the expiration of that time and
within one year after the issuing of letters testamentary or
of administration.4 3 (Emphasis added).
The North Dakota statute is unique among similar statutes in other
states in that the italicized portion thereof is not found in any of
the other statutes, including that of California." The insertion of
this section would seem to indicate a realization by the legislature
that there might be some confusion if a situation arose involving
both survivng tort claims 45 and contract claims against the estate.
On the surface, these words would seem to point to a legislative
intent that the statute be construed as one pertaining to actions
arising out of tort, while the non-claim statutes are to be applied
46
only to contract claims.
The position of this section in the code is perhaps not without
significance in attempting to point to the legislative intent. The
section is presently placed in Chapter 28-01 providing for the various
40. Schwartz v. Public Adm. of County of Bronx, 50 Mlsc.2d 200, 266 N.Y.S.2d 873
(Sup. Ct. 1966) (The Court said construction of the statute as an extension would be "unconscionable").
41. See Butler V. Price, supra note 33.
42. E.g., Langroise v. Cummings, 123 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1941) (construing the Idaho
provision and its proper relationship to the probate code) , White v. Coleman, 146 Wash.
148, 262 P 232 (1927).
43. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-26 (1960).
44. See e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.150 (1962), CAL. CODE Cirv. PRoc. § 353 (1954).
45. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-26.1 (1960) (providing that all actions will survive except
those for breach of promise, alienation of affections, and libel and slander).
46. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-18-04 (1960).

NOTES
times of limitation and particularly is placed with those sections
dealing with the suspension or tolling of the general statutory
periods of limitation.4 7 This latter fact would seemingly evidence
an intent to have the statute operate as a tolling provision rather
than as a non-claim or short limitation statute.
The derivation of the section is listed as New York and California,
the former state having since altered the wording of their statute
while the latter has retained essentially the same statute as North
Dakota.48 Although the construction placed on the statute by those
states might not be binding on any future interpretation by the
North Dakota court,' 9 it would certainly provide some guide for
any decision. While the North Dakota court has not ruled on
the effect to be given the section, California has passed on the
section on several occasions. 50 The California provision has been
consistently construed as operating to allow the plaintiff an additional
period of time to bring suit if such time is needed. Thus, the
section may serve to enlarge the statute of limitations but will
not operate to shorten it.5 1 As noted earlier, this is as well true
52
of other jurisdictions having a similar statute.
A district court m North Dakota has held that the statute should
be read as a non-claim statute thus barring the plaintiff's cause
of action after one year from the issuing of letters testamentary
regardless of the time remaining of the general statutory period. 5
The feeling of the court there was that the administration of the
estate can be entirely finalized at an earlier date by construing the
section in this manner. 54 Although such an approach would serve
to integrate the judicial procedure as to probate with the various
provisions regarding limitation periods, accomplishing it m tis
way would seemingly lead only to confusion. This would seem to
be especially true where the defendant dies shortly after the statute
begins running. In this event, a plaintiff relying on the general
47. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-01-24, -34 (1960).
48. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoC. § 353 (1954).
49. But see Bonde v. Stern, 73 N.D. 273, 14 N.W.2d 249 (1944) (New York construction adopted with the New York Code of Civil Procedure) State v. Blaisdell, 18 N.D. 31,
119 N.W 360 (190,9) (Presumption that the legislature adopted a statutory provision with
the knowledge of the construction placed on it by the parent state).
50. E.g., San Francisco Bank v. St. Clair, 47 Cal.App.2d 194, 117 P.2d 703 (Dist.Ct.App.
Lowell v. Kier.
1941), Harris v. Mt. Washington Co., 55 Cal.App. 144, 202 P 903 (1921)
50 Cal. 646 (1875) , Smith v. Hall, 19 Cal. 85 (1861).
10
(1953).
729,
264
P.2d
41
Cal.2d
51. E.g., Berger v. O'Hearn,
52. See cases supra, note 21.
53. Schwartz v. Estate of Keller, 6th Jud. Dist. No. Dak., (March 9, 1966) "The court
concludes, therefore, that since plaintiffs failed to bring their one (1) year after the Issuance of letters testamentary, the causes of action are barred by Section 28-01-26
N.D.C.C."
(4) Would require
54. Id. at 12, "Manifestly any other construction of said section
the executor or administrator to bring suits within one year after the death of the decedent but authorize claimant to sue the executor in causes of action arising out of tort,
where such action survives, within two to four years after letters of administration or
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statute of limitations (e.g. 6 years) might lose his cause if he
failed to learn of the defendant's death or for some other reason
55
delayed bringing the action.

CONCLUSION

It is apparent from a perusal of the decisions m other states
that the quoted provision of the North Dakota statute was originally
designed to provide additional time to bring suit where the statute
might otherwise have run between the death of the defendant and
the appointment off an administrator 11 If this is not the end desired
by a particular jurisdiction, the best course would be a clarification
of their statute to reflect the exact result sought." As the North
Dakota statute now reads, the possibility of differing interpretations
could be easily resolved by an addition to, or alteration of, the
present statute.58 If, on the other hand, the legislature should
want to provide a shorter period or non-claim statute applicable
to actions arising out of tort, the logical solution here would be
to provide for such in the probate section with a corresponding
modification of the section here involved. As the section now exists,
there is certainly much ground for differing interpretations, with
resulting confusion and injustice.
GARYLLE

B.

STEWART

testamentary were issued and probate proceedings were completed, the estate distributed and closed and the executor discharged, (5) Would require claimants who have
claims arising upon contract or that were contingent to present, file and prove their claims
within 90 days after the first publication of notice to creditors but would authorize claimants with claims based upon tort to sue after the expiration of two to four years from
the issuance of letters of administration or testamentary or even after the estate is finally
administered and executor has been discharged, (6) Would render the requirement that
the administrator or executor render final account within 6 months or 1 year or as soon
as tthe estate can be closed, meaningless and ineffective, if the administrator or executor
would have to wait from two to four years after the issuance of letters before he could
close the estate, to make sure that no one brought an action under the 6 year statute of
limitations, before probate proceedings were completed and the estate closed and the
executor discharged from his trust."
55. E.g., Schwartz v. Estate of Keller, supra note 53 (Injury occurred May 26, 1961,
Defendant died May 23, 1963. An executor was appointed June 23, 1963 and on April 9,
1964 the estate was closed. The plaintiff secured the appointment of a special administrator
and brought the action January 10, 1966).
56. E.g., Berger v. O'Hearn, supra note 51.
57. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. J 734.28 (1964) (Provision re-phrased and meaning entirely
changed), MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.16 (1947) (Provision re-phrased) , N.Y. CIV. PROC. I
210 (b) (1963) (Provision entirely re-phrased).
58. E.g., ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 83, § 20 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (Clarifies the last section to
read, "After the expiration of the time limited for the commencement of the action, and
within 9 months after the issuing of letters testamentary or of administration.") , S.D.
CODE § 33.0205 (1939) (Adds; "The time shall not be extended for a period exceeding two
years from the death of a person to the commencement of the action against his executors
or administrators.").

